

DDI #0256-83/1
19 January 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, OGI
FROM : Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT : Late Stage Indicators of Insurgent Success

I have again read this paper and offer the following observations:

- It seems to me that in both Guatamala and El Salvador the paper underestimates the implications for both governments of insurgent success in disrupting economic life. Over a longer term it seems to me this can only be terribly damaging to government efforts to maintain order, extend authority and cope with discontent arising out of economic conditions.
- I think there should be a prefatory note for the paper on the methodology that in effect tells the reader that we are using all of these indicators and putting them together in order to offer insights into political instability and insurgency; that the individual indicators by themselves are not particularly unique or insightful; and that what distinguishes the paper and this approach is an effort to make explicit heretofore implicit assumptions and a systematic approach to a broad range of factors that can be examined regularly to detect change toward greater instability, the progress of an insurgency or developments in the opposite direction. In short, it would suggest that it is systemizing of the analytic process and the opportunity to return to it regularly with the same criteria that offers advantage from this kind of an approach.
- I have a sense I am reading several different sets of indicators in this and Jay's paper on the Philippines. Is there one set of indicators for instability, another for the progress of opposition to parties establishing the leadership and potential for takeover, and yet a third on progress of insurgencies? If that is the case I think we need to make all of that fairly explicit. I say that because at present I am pretty confused about which indicators are which, which are country specific and


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which are generically suitable for use against a broad number of countries. We need to make all of this more explicit.

-- I think the discussion particularly at the Annex on Vietnam is pretty simplistic.

-- When this paper and Jay's have been redone I would like to see both of the papers again to see how they relate to one another.



Robert M. Gates